Ways to think about token pricing

There are only two things you can say with certainty about token prices: we’re in a supply crunch, and this is unstable. All of the variables are in play, and the market will get shaken out over the next few years to arrive at a new equilibrium. Right now we have a lot of frantic analysis of ‘time to power’, but the question at the end of that remains whether the foundation models have sustainable pricing power, strategic leverage and value capture, or whether they become low-margin commodity infrastructure providers. At the moment, I think every dynamic we can see points to the latter. Clearly, the situation today is transitory. On the supply side, a trillion dollars or more of data centre capex is coming down the pipe (and plenty more semiconductor capex behind that), inference efficiency continues to improve very quickly, and new models are far more (or far less!) efficient in their token use. On the demand side, although the market has been capacity-constrained since 2022, the crunch in the first half of this year has been driven by sudden product-market fit in really just one use case, software development, and that’s actually a pretty small field (imagine if we had product-market fit for a consumer use case with hundreds of millions of DAUs - today’s infrastructure couldn’t support it at any price). We don’t know what the next use-cases to scale will be, nor when that would be, nor what their token needs would be. Going up a level, it’s been pretty widely reported that inference today has 40-50% gross margins: this includes deprecation of the associated server costs (or the cost of renting them), but we don’t really know the asset life (five years? Seven years?) and obviously this doesn’t include the cost of training the next model a couple of times a year, which…

Predicting AI job exposure

It would be really nice if we had some way to analyse which jobs, companies and industries were exposed to AI, and if we could assign scores, and build charts, and map that against the progress of large language models. We know, in principle, that like every other big wave of technology, AI is bound to destroy some jobs and create others. But which ones? In the last three years a bunch of people have been very busy crunching census data, making tables and building viral charts. I think this is mostly impossible: I think this is an exercise in predicting something that cannot be predicted. The simplest way to see the problem is to back-test this against other big technology shifts in the past. Some of the industries that should have suffered most ended up much bigger, and some of the industries that did suffer most should have been immune. Hence, we spent a century automating accounting: we built calculating machines, punch cards, mainframes, data processing, databases, PCs, spreadsheets, ERPs, cloud… in fact, we built half of the tech industry around automating this. Yet the number of accountants kept going up. This is high-level survey data, but you can see much the same thing at the micro level. The next chart is about as specific as it gets: 50 years of financial automation doesn’t seem to have hurt the market for CPAs. If you’d done any kind of analysis of professions exposed to automation from computing, this should have been at the top of the list. Dan Bricklin talks about CPAs in the late 1970s using VisiCalc to do one-month projects in a few days. And yet, look what happened. I think there are three things to point to in this chart. The first is that technology was not the only variable: changes in regulation produced new accounting requirements that led to a…